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Abstract
How is it that populations react so dierently to policy incentives
among developed countries? We noticed that senior employment rates
not only dier in level strikingly from one country to another, they also
dier in their reaction to retirement incentives set by governments.
We show the importance of trust given to the employer in wage nego-
tiations by a simple trade-o model. According to this model, reaction of
the senior activity rate to policy changes depends on the properties of the
distribution of trust to employers at the country level. We then identify
these properties by an empirical study based on panel data for nineteen
OECD countries from 1980 to 2004. We show that the elasticity of senior
males labor force participation rate to retirement incentives is stronger in
countries with better and more homogeneously distributed working condi-
tions. This results also applies to countries with higher generalized trust.
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Keywords: Early retirement incentives, labor relations, seniors activity rate,
trust.
¤
We thank Yann Algan, David Blau, Pierre Cahuc, Andrew Clark, Mathieu Couttenier, Lu-
cie Gadenne and all seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics for their comments
and Romain Duval for giving us access to implicit taxes data.
y
Paris School of Economics - blake@pse.ens.fr
z
Paris School of Economics - sangnier@pse.ens.fr
1
1 Introduction and backround
Motivation
The issue of the eciency of economic reforms is a central one in public policy
agenda. Once a reform has been shown desirable by economic theory or empir-
ical test, it not always produce desired eects when implemented. Labor force
participation of older individuals is motivated both by the general issue of labor
force participation in order to produce wealth and by the sustainability of pen-
sion systems. Most of the developed countries have been constantly adjusting
pension systems during the last decades to reach these objectives. This is why
one of the main point of the Lisbon strategy to develop Europe was the fostering
of senior employment in order to make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive
and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. The weak values
of this economic indicator in some European countries was considered a restrain
for growth and in the same period.
The policies lead to increase senior employment rate can be the postponing
of the standard retirement age or the decreasing of retirement incentives. The
later instrument includes pension and contribution rates changes. However, the
eect of these policies is far from homogeneous in all countries : while in some
countries population respond automatically to incentives, in other countries, no
policy seems to aect senior employment, or very lightly.
If we consider the instance of Finland and Italy, we easily notice those strik-
ing dierences. In gure 1, illustrating the case of Finland, we notice a perfect
symmetric movement of incentives to retirement at 55 and the senior activity
rate. The standard retirement age in Finland did not change a bit in this pe-
riod, remaining at 65. On the contrary, if we look at gure 2, when the Italian
government strongly decreased the incentive to retirement in the second half
of the 1990s, the senior employment rate continued its decreasing trend. It is
even more striking if we consider that this decrease in monetary incentive went
alongside an increase of the standard retirement age from 60 in 1993 to 65 in
2002.
In this paper, we show how the quality of labor relations in a country is likely
to alter the response senior activity rate to changes in retirement incentives.
We present a model where senior workers have the choice between working
and retirement. Their choice is aected by their perception of labor relations
and generosity of the pension system. At the aggregate level, the response of
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Figure 1 : Senior activity rate and implicit tax on continued work, including
eraly retirement incentives, for Finland.
Figure 2 : Senior activity rate and implicit tax on continued work, including
eraly retirement incentives, for Italy.
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senior labor force participation rate to change in retirement incentives depends
in the distribution of trust to employers in the society. We show that trust to
employers, approximated by labor relations, non-monetary rewards employees
may get from their work and trust in others, foster the elasticity of senior male
participation rate with respect to the implicit tax on continued work, which is
the cost of staying at work compared with retiring.
Literature background
Our paper is related to several axis of literature. The rst one is on policy
eciency in dierent backgrounds. Our rst inspiration was linked to the article
by Acemoglu et al. (2008) which points out the importance of constraints on
politics in a central bank reform aiming at ghting ination.
Institutional determinants of retirement inspired a large literature which
makes our second axis. Duval (2003), whose measures we used in the empirical
section, studied the importance of monetary incentives given by the social sys-
tem in the determination of senior employment rates. He showed that a decrease
of the incentive to retirement may reduce the fall of employment between two
ve-years age groups (for instance from 60 to 64 or 55 to 59). In a dynamic
approach, Blau and Goodstein (2009) investigate to what extent changes in so-
cial security rules explain changes in labor force participation of seniors in the
United States. Blau and Shvydko (2007) focused on the characteristics of rms
and contracts. By an empirical study, they showed that seniors' choice of re-
tirement also depends on the rigidities of technologies. According to Cheron et
al. (2004), trying to increase senior employment by a change of pension scheme
is useless if wages are rigid and above their walrasian level. Their point out
the importance of rms' decisions in the senior employment rate. If their are
the only decision makers (which is the case when wages are rigid and above the
walrasian level), employment will not respond to incentives given to employees.
The third axis of literature linked to our subject treats the importance of
labor relations. Such idea on the inuence of labor relations on macroeconomic
outputs was studied in a very practical approach by Blanchard and Phillipon
(2004). Considering the number of social conicts as a proxy for bad labor rela-
tions, they showed that bad relations strengthen the negative eect of asymmet-
ric information on the job market. We use a more subjective proxy to estimate
labor relations but the form of asymmetric information we use is similar : only
the rm knows the real value of the output of a match and the worker estimates
4
her probability for the employer to be dishonest.
Understanding labor relations as a component of a country's cultural trait,
this paper is also linked to the the literature on economic outcomes of culture.
Interactions between labor markets outcomes and culture has been investigated
by Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008). They show that policy can aect co-
operation on the labor market depending on individual expectations regarding
collective relations organization. The way culture and beliefs can aect activity
rates has been underlined by Giavazzi, Schiantarelli and Seranelli (2009). They
show that culture matters for women employment rate.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model
and derive its implications. In section 3, we describe the data used in the
empirical part. Section 4 presents macroeconomic empirical results and section
5 concludes.
2 The model
Senior individuals face a trade-o between work and retirement. This model
shows how their choice depends on labor relations and how the distribution of
working conditions alter the link between retirement incentives and labor force
participation rate at the macroeconomic level.
Individual trade-o
Before they have a full right to a public pension system, seniors can chose early
retirement. We follow Blanchard and Philippon's hypothesis of asymmetric
information : in the wage negotiation, workers do not know their productivity
but employers do. Employers can give the wrong information in order to pay
a lower wage. Thus, if the worker chooses between work and early retirement,
she has to take into account the probability for employers to be dishonest.
Let hi be the subjective individual probability for the worker i to have an
honest employer. There are two types of productivity and their corresponding
wages. If the productivity is good, then the wage should be set at wg, if pro-
ductivity is bad, then it is set at level wb. Of course, wg is superior to wb. Let
us have ½ the proportion of good workers. This proportion is known by the
worker but she does not know her own status. Thus the actualized value of
early retirement is :
V R = ®p+ l + ¯ (®p+ l)
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where p is a full pension. It is truncated in proportion ® for the entire life if
the individual retires early, that is before the usual age. Parameter ¯ is the
discount rate and l is the value of leisure.
The actualized value of working is then :
VW = hi[½wg + (1¡ ½)wb] + (1¡ hi)wb + ¯(p+ l):
Then, the worker will chose early retirement if and only if :
V R ¸ VW
() (®p+ l)(1 + ¯) ¸ hi[½wg + (1¡ ½)wb] + (1¡ hi)wb + ¯(p+ l)
that is if:
hi · (®p+ l)(1 + ¯)¡ [wb + ¯(p+ l)]
½(wg ¡ wb)
Aggregate results
If in a given country c, trust to employer follows the cumulative distributive
function Fc, then the proportion of seniors choosing early retirement n
c
R given
a policy incentive ® will be :
ncR(®) = Fc
µ
(®p+ l)(1 + ¯)¡ [wb + ¯(p+ l)]
½(wg ¡ wb)
¶
Let nc be the labor force participation of seniors in country c. Since n = 1¡nR,
we get :
nc = 1¡ Fc
µ
(®p+ l)(1 + ¯)¡ [wb + ¯(p+ l)]
½(wg ¡ wb)
¶
See appendix for threshold values of ® for which either nobody or everyone
choose to retire. Given the main properties of a cumulative distributive function,
since hi²[0; 1], we have the following properties :
1. For a given policy (®; p), the resulting labor force participation rate in
country c depends on the distribution of labor relations Fc.
2. The derivative of nc with respect to ® is
@nc
@®
= ¡@Fc (:)
@®
®p
½(wg ¡ wg) :
Since @Fc=@® ¸ 0, we get @nc=@® · 0. This implies that the stronger the
6
incentive to retire early, the stronger the proportion of seniors who stop
working. Individuals respond to incentives unless the density of variable hi
is null. But the size of the eect of ® on nc depends on the characteristics
of the distribution function Fc.
As a result, the eectiveness of early retirement incentives depends on the prop-
erties of the distribution of trust to employers.
3 Data
This section describes data used in this paper. We used data from several
sources. Our sample includes 19 countries : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan South Korea, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and
United States. We focus on seniors male individuals in order to avoid all issues
related to female employment.
Senior activity rates
Senior activity rates are taken from the Key Indicators of the Labor Market
provided by the International Labor Organization. Data are available for males
and females by age group from 1980 onwards. We selected data for males aged
between 55 and 64. Senior activity rates do dier in space, but also exhibit
dierent evolutions in time.
Pension system
Pension system generosity is measured using the implicit tax on continued work
developed by Duval (2003). The average implicit tax on continued work is com-
puted at a given age for a ve year period. It takes into account expected pension
wealth and both employers and employees rates of contribution to the pension
system. In other terms, when the implicit tax on continued work increases, a
worker has weaker incentives to continue working. For a detailed presentation
of the methodology, see Duval (2003). In this paper, we use the measures for
the 55-60 and the 60-64 age groups as alternative indicators of the whole pen-
sion system generosity. For each age group, the implicit tax is available with
or without early retirement schemes. However, implicit tax including early re-
tirement route is by construction less trustworthy since information about early
7
retirement eligibility are hard to assemble. This is why we focused on the indi-
cators without early retirement schemes and estimations involving implicit tax
on continued work including early retirement route are presented in appendix.
Working conditions
We use ISSP surveys about work orientations to measure work relations. This
survey has been conducted in 1989, 1997 and 2005 in 30 countries. Among the
broad set of questions asked to workers, we selected four questions that reect
two aspect of working conditions. Two of them are explicitly and directly related
to relations at the workplace, namely :
² rel management : In general, how would you describe relations at your
workplace between management and employees ?
² rel workmates : In general, how would you describe relations at your
workplace between work- mates/colleagues ?
Answers to those questions are coded from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good).
The two other questions are related to he non-monetary payo workers may
get from their work :
² job justformoney : How much you agree or disagree with each statement,
thinking of work in general : A job is just a way of earning money - no
more.
² job evenwithoutmoney : How much you agree or disagree with each state-
ment, thinking of work in general : I would enjoy having a paid job even
if I did not need the money.
Answers to those questions are coded from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly
disagree). Hence, we recoded job evenwithoutmoney in the opposite way to get
a measure that reects improving working conditions.
For each of these question, we construct two basic indicators that may re-
ect some aspects of the distribution of working conditions at the country level.
The simplest indicator is the average answer. The other one is the coecient of
variation, i.e. the ratio of standard deviation to mean for each variable. This is
a broad measure for the dispersion of the variable.
Unfortunately, these questions are only asked to workers and since we are in-
terested in working conditions perceived by all seniors, including those who
8
are retired, the computed indicator may be biased if only seniors are selected.
Hence, we used male workers aged between 35 and 54 to asses the perception of
working conditions at the country level.
In panel data estimations, we assign working conditions for missing years
using the following simple method : for years 1980-1989, we use the 1989 working
conditions measure if available, for years 1990-1996 the 1997 measure and for
years 1998 onwards the 2005 measure. If a country has been surveyed only once
or twice, we replicate this method, but using only available measures.
Control variables
Panel data regressions include wealth and economic activity indicators as control
variables. Wealth is measured using the (log of) real GDP per capita provided
by the Penn World Table. We take the OECD male unemployment rate as
a proxy for economic activity at the country level. We also use the standard
retirement age provided by Duval (2003).
4 Empirical results
This section presents empirical evidence. We rst show that working conditions
explain some of cross country dierences in senior activity rates. Then, we
use panel data estimates to show that senior activity rate do react stronger to
changes in incentives in countries with better working conditions. Since senior
activity rates and implicit taxes are always taken in log, estimated coecients
reect elasticities of labor market participation to retirement incentives.
Cross country evidence
We pooled all available observations in order to investigate the cross-country re-
lationship between working conditions and senior activity rates. Table 1 presents
the estimated coecients for dierent specications. In column 1, we simply
regress senior males activity rate on average relation between management and
employees. The estimated coecient is positive and signicant at the 5% level.
In column 2, we include a dummy variable for European countries to be sure
that this relationship is not driven only by the opposition between Europe and
the rest of the world. The estimated coecient on rel management increases
and becomes signicant at the 1% level. The dummy variable for European
9
countries is negative and signicant. This implies that senior labor force par-
ticipation rates are weaker in Europe than in the rest of the world. In column
3, we control by the implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59 : this
variable is not signicant whereas relation between management and employees
remains signicant at the 5% level and has the same order of magnitude as in
former specications. In column 4, we add real GDP per capita and standard
retirement age as additional control variable, which lowers the signicance of
the coecient on rel management, though not too far from 10%.
In columns 5 to 16 we repeat the same exercise with the three others measures
of working conditions. The eect of rel workmates and job evenwithoutmoney
variables is robust to the introduction of standard retirement age. However, we
nd no signicant eect of variable job justformoney on senior activity rate.
As shown in tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 in appendix, using other measures of re-
tirement incentives (for age group 60-64 or including early retirement incentives)
as control variables gives very similar results. When signicant, the coecient
of the implicit tax variable is negative. This result is consistent with our pre-
diction that controlling for working conditions, generosity of the pension system
has a negative impact on senior activity rate.
Figures 3 and 4 shows the positive relationship between labor force participa-
tion rate of seniors and the variables rel management and job evenwithoutmoney
in 2005. In line with estimations made here, working conditions explain a sub-
stantial part of dierences in senior activity rate across countries. Figures 5 and
6 in appendix describe the same relationship for rel workmates and job just-
formoney. Consistently with pooled regressions results, there is no signicant
eect of the later on activity rate.
Hence, in a cross section of countries, better working conditions are associ-
ated with stronger labor fore participation rate of senior males.
Panel data evidence
We rst estimate the average eect of the implicit taxes on senior activity rate.
Table 2 displays estimated coecients. It is clear that wealth, measured as the
real GDP per capita, and economic activity, measured as male unemployment
rate, both have a negative eect on labor force participation rate of seniors.
The eect of wealth on the dependent variable suggests that non-participation
to the labor market increases as the economy grows. However, when including
time xed eect in order to control for the evolution of senior activity rate
10
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Figure 3 : Seniors activity rate and relations between mangement and employees
in 2005.
ISSP Work Orientation 2005 for all countries except Austria (1989), Italy (1997)
and Netherlands (1997). Labor force participation rate of males aged between
55 and 64.
Figure 4 : Seniors activity rate and I would enjoy having a paid job even if I
did not need the money in 2005.
ISSP Work Orientation 2005 for all countries except Austria (1989), Italy (1997)
and Netherlands (1997). Labor force participation rate of males aged between
55 and 64.
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common to all countries, the eect of real GDP per capita vanishes. This
suggests that labor force participation rate of seniors depends more on broad
global economic developments than on specic national wealth eects. We nd
no signicant eect of standard retirement age. This means that changes in
standard retirement age is not a major determinant of senior activity rate at
the country level.
Neglecting the case of implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59,
the estimated elasticity of implicit tax variables is roughly equal to ¡0:03 is
most demanding specications. The corresponding eect for implicit tax for
age group 55-59 is null.
Interaction between implicit tax and average working conditions
We now allow the eect of implicit tax on continued work to vary with the
distribution of working conditions. Hence, the estimated equation is now :
nit = ±1Tit + ±2WiTit + ±3Xit + Ci + ±4 + "it;
where nit denotes labor force participation rate of senior males in country i at
time t, Tit the implicit tax on continued work, Wit working conditions and Xit
a vector of control variables (wealth, unemployment and standard retirement
age). The variable Ci is the country xed eect, ± the constant and eit the
error term. More complete specications include year xed eects Yt. Thus,
the estimated elasticity may now vary with working conditions :
@ni
@Ti
= ±^1 + ±^2Wi:
Table 3 uses the implicit tax for age group 55-59. The measure of working
conditions is the average value of each variable at the country level. In the case
of rel management and rel workmates, the interaction term is always positive
and strongly signicant even when including time xed eects and standard
retirement age. This implies that countries with average better working condi-
tions react stronger to changes in incentives than others. The two bottom line
of the table present the values of elasticities for the countries with lower and
higher working conditions. The previously null estimated eect ranges in fact
from 0 to ¡0:04 or ¡0:05 depending on the working conditions variable used.
Estimations using the variable job justformoney produce weaker results. In
the simplest specication (column 7), the interaction term is signicant and
13
Table 2 - Panel data : Benchmark estimation
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Implicit tax for age group 55-59 Implicit tax for age group 60-64
Implicit tax -0.0191 -0.0179 -0.0164 -0.0284** -0.0315*** -0.0380***
(0.239) (0.353) (0.388) (0.0356) (0.00642) (0.00719)
Unemployment rate -0.00957*** -0.00633*** -0.00623*** -0.0112*** -0.00661*** -0.00714***
(0) (0.00826) (0.00814) (0) (0.000299) (0.00103)
Real GDP per capita -0.153*** -0.124 -0.116 -0.144*** -0.0209 -0.0731
(5.77e-09) (0.126) (0.146) (3.98e-07) (0.727) (0.282)
Standard retirement age 0.00235 -0.0115
(0.840) (0.266)
Constant 5.787*** 5.513*** 5.276*** 5.725*** 4.528*** 5.790***
(0) (1.83e-10) (2.35e-05) (0) (0) (1.08e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 288 288 288 300 300 289
R-squared (within) 0.192 0.450 0.450 0.229 0.496 0.507
Number of countries 18 18 18 19 19 19
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Implicit tax for age group 55-59 Implicit tax for age group 60-64
including early retirement route including early retirement route
Implicit tax -0.0432*** -0.0285* -0.0272* -0.0349*** -0.0298*** -0.0322***
(0.00700) (0.0604) (0.0684) (0.00288) (0.00156) (0.00375)
Unemployment rate -0.0116*** -0.00675*** -0.00664*** -0.0109*** -0.00603*** -0.00662***
(0) (0.00292) (0.00243) (0) (0.000824) (0.00182)
Real GDP per capita -0.189*** -0.0762 -0.0674 -0.145*** -0.0124 -0.0564
(0) (0.242) (0.268) (2.42e-08) (0.839) (0.396)
Standard retirement age 0.00388 -0.00792
(0.746) (0.422)
Constant 6.225*** 5.067*** 4.729*** 5.768*** 4.457*** 5.404***
(0) (0) (5.54e-06) (0) (0) (1.15e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 306 306 306 317 317 306
R-squared (within) 0.296 0.498 0.500 0.264 0.493 0.499
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3 - Panel data : Interactions with average working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax 0.253*** 0.229** 0.250** 0.288*** 0.215** 0.235**
(0.000914) (0.0160) (0.0122) (0.000206) (0.0233) (0.0143)
Interaction -0.0721*** -0.0658*** -0.0702*** -0.0750*** -0.0568*** -0.0607***
(0.000181) (0.00390) (0.00296) (4.10e-05) (0.00673) (0.00396)
Unemployment rate -0.00984*** -0.00682*** -0.00659*** -0.00942*** -0.00608** -0.00581**
(0) (0.00337) (0.00390) (0) (0.0102) (0.0121)
Real GDP per capita -0.153*** -0.133* -0.111 -0.146*** -0.110 -0.0882
(2.08e-09) (0.0717) (0.137) (7.49e-09) (0.145) (0.243)
Standard retirement age 0.00634 0.00591
(0.560) (0.592)
Constant 5.790*** 5.615*** 4.981*** 5.718*** 5.384*** 4.779***
(0) (0) (3.15e-05) (0) (0) (7.46e-05)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288
R-squared (within) 0.226 0.478 0.481 0.234 0.473 0.476
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Min eect 0 0 0 0 -0,01 0
Max eect -0,06 -0,05 -0,05 -0,05 -0,04 -0,04
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax 0.0708* -0.0561 -0.0539 0.00938 0.0822 0.0938
(0.0723) (0.245) (0.252) (0.897) (0.221) (0.187)
Interaction -0.0275** 0.0116 0.0114 -0.00847 -0.0299* -0.0324*
(0.0328) (0.350) (0.354) (0.642) (0.0655) (0.0571)
Unemployment rate -0.00911*** -0.00682*** -0.00672*** -0.00945*** -0.00586** -0.00561**
(5.11e-10) (0.00895) (0.00863) (6.26e-11) (0.0165) (0.0208)
Real GDP per capita -0.150*** -0.141 -0.133 -0.155*** -0.144* -0.128
(1.45e-08) (0.112) (0.126) (1.53e-08) (0.0569) (0.100)
Standard retirement age 0.00222 0.00506
(0.849) (0.655)
Constant 5.750*** 5.683*** 5.456*** 5.798*** 5.708*** 5.213***
(0) (1.47e-09) (2.52e-05) (0) (0) (3.07e-05)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288
R-squared (within) 0.200 0.451 0.452 0.193 0.462 0.464
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Min eect 0 - - - -0,08 -0,09
Max eect -0,04 - - - -0,12 -0,13
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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negative. However, this eect does not persist in more when using time xed
eects. This result mirrors the one found in cross section regressions. When
using job evenwithoutmoney, only the interaction term is signicant. This leads
to stronger estimated elasticities. In appendix, tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 present
the coecients of the same regressions, but using dierent implicit taxes. The
results are broadly similar to the later.
Consequently, labor participation rate of senior react stronger to changes in
retirement incentives in countries with better average working conditions.
Interaction between implicit tax and the dispersion of working con-
ditions
We will now use the coecient of variation of working conditions at the country
level as an indicator of the distribution of the quality of labor relations. Table 4
uses the implicit tax on continued work for age group 60-64 as pension system
generosity measure. For rel management and rel workmates variables, the in-
teraction term between implicit tax and the coecient of variation, an indicator
of the dispersion of working conditions, is positive and signicant in all spec-
ications. The positivity of the coecient suggest that countries with more a
more homogeneous distribution of working conditions react stronger to changes
in incentives than countries with higher dispersion of working conditions. In
the two bottom lines of the table, the reading order is opposite to the one in
former tables. The maximum (minimum) eect is the elasticity associated with
the country with the higher (lower) dispersion of working conditions.
In the second part of table 4, we use the coecient of variation of vari-
ables job justformoney and job evenwithoutmoney to assess the distribution of
working conditions at the country level. Estimated interactions are all non-
signicant. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 in appendix replicate the same exercise, but
using alternative implicit taxes. Results are fully in line with those presented
here.
Thus, labor participation rate of seniors react stronger to changes in re-
tirement incentives in countries with more homogeneous working conditions.
However, this results is restricted to rel management and rel workmates vari-
ables.
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Table 4 - Panel data : Interactions with the dispersion of working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 60-64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax -0.0517*** -0.0629*** -0.0625*** -0.0692*** -0.0680*** -0.0677***
(0.00393) (4.88e-06) (0.000377) (0.000294) (7.20e-06) (8.01e-05)
Interaction 0.0982* 0.133** 0.109** 0.289*** 0.259*** 0.240***
(0.0754) (0.0143) (0.0362) (0.000170) (0.000741) (0.000621)
Unemployment rate -0.0111*** -0.00566*** -0.00627*** -0.0101*** -0.00501*** -0.00515**
(0) (0.00266) (0.00416) (1.80e-10) (0.00640) (0.0160)
Real GDP per capita -0.134*** 0.0217 -0.0274 -0.125*** 0.0155 -0.0150
(1.31e-06) (0.740) (0.708) (3.79e-06) (0.791) (0.823)
Standard retirement age -0.00732 -0.00607
(0.479) (0.523)
Constant 5.630*** 4.118*** 5.078*** 5.534*** 4.173*** 4.862***
(0) (1.07e-09) (2.39e-06) (0) (0) (4.68e-07)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 300 300 289 300 300 289
R-squared (within) 0.239 0.513 0.516 0.273 0.530 0.534
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect -0,04 -0,05 -0,05 -0,05 -0,05 -0,05
Max eect -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax -0.0340* -0.0245 -0.0351* -0.0263* -0.0383*** -0.0466***
(0.0789) (0.103) (0.0512) (0.0722) (0.000653) (0.00274)
Interaction 0.0144 -0.0175 -0.00758 -0.00715 0.0231 0.0287
(0.683) (0.574) (0.832) (0.795) (0.418) (0.321)
Unemployment rate -0.0111*** -0.00691*** -0.00729*** -0.0113*** -0.00635*** -0.00679***
(6.16e-10) (0.000475) (0.00274) (0) (0.000765) (0.00229)
Real GDP per capita -0.145*** -0.0235 -0.0748 -0.144*** -0.0243 -0.0782
(2.49e-07) (0.699) (0.282) (7.63e-07) (0.686) (0.257)
Standard retirement age -0.0113 -0.0118
(0.278) (0.246)
Constant 5.731*** 4.560*** 5.803*** 5.719*** 4.554*** 5.852***
(0) (0) (1.08e-08) (0) (0) (1.24e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 300 300 289 300 300 289
R-squared (within) 0.230 0.497 0.507 0.229 0.498 0.510
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect - - - - - -
Max eect - - - - - -
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
17
Interaction between implicit tax and generalized trust
In table 5, we replace working conditions by trust of males aged between 55 and
64. Trust is measured at the country level using the European Values Survey
and the World Values Survey. Trust is the share of people who answer most
people can be trusted to the following question : Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people ? This widely used measure of trust in others is recognized
as a proxy for many aspects of cooperation and condence incentives. Table 5
shows that trust in others play the same role as the quality of labor relations
in the response of seniors participation rate to retirement incentives. The in-
teraction term between trust and implicit tax is always negative and strongly
signicant. As previously, we nd that the elasticity of senior activity rate to
pension generosity is stronger in countries with higher trust. This result holds
for all specications (controlling for standard retirement age and including time
xed eects) and when using dierent measures of implicit tax on continued
work. We do not measure the role of the dispersion of trust since it will not
provide additional information in the case of a Bernoulli variable. All the infor-
mation about the distribution function is summarized in the average answer.
Hence, labor force participation rate of seniors react stronger to changes in
retirement incentives in countries with higher trust.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we tried to identify the causes of dierent reactions of the senior
populations to monetary incentives between countries. By a very simple model
we rst showed that one of the main determinant of how seniors react to policies
is the distribution of trust given to employers in wage bargaining.We then used
panel data from OCDE and opinions about working conditions from ISSP in 19
countries to see more precisely in what conditions incentive policies are more
ecient.
We found that if the average opinion about labor relations is good in a
country, then senior employment will be more sensitive to changes in policy.
We also found that concerning only questions specic to relations in the labor
place reactions to policies are stronger when opinions are homogenous.
Finally, using the literature on social capital and as a prolongation of our
work, we considered the role of trust in other people in the general way. It
18
Table 5 - Panel data : Interaction with trust
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Implicit tax for age group 55-59 Implicit tax for age group 60-64
Implicit tax 0.00449 0.000870 0.00193 -0.00389 -0.0146 -0.0170
(0.772) (0.966) (0.922) (0.768) (0.222) (0.236)
Interaction with trust -0.0608*** -0.0470** -0.0467** -0.0547*** -0.0373** -0.0448***
(0.00878) (0.0143) (0.0170) (0.00576) (0.0113) (0.00307)
Unemployment rate -0.0106*** -0.00668*** -0.00660*** -0.0126*** -0.00739*** -0.00786***
(0) (0.00494) (0.00485) (0) (6.41e-05) (0.000252)
Real GDP per capita -0.156*** -0.111 -0.104 -0.155*** -0.0174 -0.0670
(1.87e-09) (0.165) (0.181) (1.67e-08) (0.773) (0.318)
Standard retirement age 0.00186 -0.0127
(0.873) (0.207)
Constant 5.825*** 5.389*** 5.202*** 5.837*** 4.496*** 5.812***
(0) (2.39e-10) (2.12e-05) (0) (0) (4.69e-09)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 288 288 288 300 300 289
Number of countries 18 18 18 19 19 19
R-squared (within) 0.216 0.463 0.463 0.260 0.510 0.526
Min eect -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01
Max eect -0,05 -0,04 -0,03 -0,04 -0,03 -0,03
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Implicit tax for age group 55-59 Implicit tax for age group 60-64
including early retirement route including early retirement route
Implicit tax -0.0212 -0.00714 -0.00518 -0.0180 -0.0140 -0.0127
(0.231) (0.667) (0.749) (0.144) (0.171) (0.297)
Interaction with trust -0.0451*** -0.0446*** -0.0454*** -0.0349** -0.0333*** -0.0383***
(0.00256) (0.000651) (0.000505) (0.0214) (0.00643) (0.00319)
Unemployment rate -0.0129*** -0.00792*** -0.00780*** -0.0120*** -0.00686*** -0.00731***
(0) (0.000335) (0.000270) (0) (0.000210) (0.000620)
Real GDP per capita -0.196*** -0.0799 -0.0690 -0.151*** -0.00713 -0.0463
(0) (0.214) (0.254) (2.62e-09) (0.908) (0.494)
Standard retirement age 0.00488 -0.00870
(0.675) (0.366)
Constant 6.297*** 5.104*** 4.679*** 5.835*** 4.407*** 5.351***
(0) (0) (4.70e-06) (0) (0) (1.68e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 306 306 306 317 317 306
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared (within) 0.321 0.521 0.523 0.281 0.508 0.518
Min eect -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0 0 -0,01
Max eect -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 -0,03
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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appeared that this broader indicator has a similar explicative power than more
precise questions specic to the labor market.
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6 Appendix
Threshold values for early retirement
1. Everyone retires early if ® the incentive to early retirement is above a
threshold ¹® characterized by :
® =
½wg + (1¡ ½)wb + µp¡ l
p(1 + µ)
If the reward of early retirement is above the expected value without any
uncertainty, then everyone retires early.
2. Nobody retires early if ® the incentive to early retirement is below a
threshold ® characterized by :
® =
wb + µ(p+ l)¡ l(1 + µ)
p(1 + µ)
If the worse income of the work is more rewarded than early retirement,
then every senior prefers working.
22
Figure 5 : Seniors activity rate and relations between workmates in 2005.
ISSP Work Orientation 2005 for all countries except Austria (1989), Italy (1997)
and Netherlands (1997). Labor force participation rate of males aged between
55 and 64.
Figure 6 : Seniors activity rate and Job is not just a way to earn money in
2005.
ISSP Work Orientation 2005 for all countries except Austria (1989), Italy (1997)
and Netherlands (1997). Labor force participation rate of males aged between
55 and 64.
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Table 3.1 - Panel data : Interactions with average working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 60-64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax 0.197*** 0.150* 0.118 0.345*** 0.255*** 0.245***
(0.00440) (0.0546) (0.110) (4.33e-07) (0.000383) (0.000334)
Interaction -0.0602*** -0.0486** -0.0413** -0.0921*** -0.0707*** -0.0690***
(0.000843) (0.0138) (0.0285) (1.07e-07) (4.11e-05) (2.91e-05)
Unemployment rate -0.0113*** -0.00658*** -0.00713*** -0.0108*** -0.00615*** -0.00630***
(0) (0.000234) (0.000801) (0) (0.000599) (0.00279)
Real GDP per capita -0.138*** -0.0129 -0.0614 -0.132*** -0.00567 -0.0415
(3.87e-07) (0.825) (0.352) (3.65e-07) (0.916) (0.494)
Standard retirement age -0.00830 -0.00848
(0.413) (0.378)
Constant 5.671*** 4.456*** 5.474*** 5.623*** 4.391*** 5.291***
(0) (0) (3.75e-08) (0) (0) (9.29e-09)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 300 300 289 300 300 289
R-squared (within) 0.255 0.512 0.518 0.290 0.531 0.539
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect -0,01 -0,02 -0,14 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02
Max eect -0,06 -0,06 -0,18 -0,08 -0,07 -0,07
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax 0.111*** 0.0252 0.0497 0.0316 0.114** 0.113**
(0.00118) (0.412) (0.198) (0.622) (0.0499) (0.0391)
Interaction -0.0434*** -0.0177* -0.0269** -0.0176 -0.0427*** -0.0447***
(0.000174) (0.0654) (0.0159) (0.318) (0.00581) (0.00289)
Unemployment rate -0.0100*** -0.00594*** -0.00564** -0.0108*** -0.00514*** -0.00589***
(1.01e-09) (0.00196) (0.0166) (1.07e-10) (0.00875) (0.00739)
Real GDP per capita -0.141*** -0.00880 -0.0427 -0.144*** -0.0315 -0.0928
(4.90e-07) (0.882) (0.538) (3.64e-07) (0.598) (0.158)
Standard retirement age -0.0130 -0.00898
(0.199) (0.353)
Constant 5.693*** 4.407*** 5.583*** 5.710*** 4.615*** 5.811***
(0) (0) (1.87e-08) (0) (0) (4.15e-09)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 300 300 289 300 300 289
R-squared (within) 0.261 0.501 0.516 0.234 0.520 0.529
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect 0,01 -0,04 -0,07 - 0 -0,01
Max eect -0,06 -0,07 -0,11 - -0,06 -0,07
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.2 - Panel data : Interactions with average working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59, including early retirement route
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax 0.255*** 0.168** 0.185** 0.197*** 0.135* 0.154**
(0.000305) (0.0238) (0.0103) (0.00556) (0.0652) (0.0270)
Interaction -0.0797*** -0.0530*** -0.0569*** -0.0578*** -0.0397** -0.0437***
(3.95e-06) (0.00421) (0.00154) (0.000168) (0.0139) (0.00438)
Unemployment rate -0.0119*** -0.00718*** -0.00702*** -0.0114*** -0.00648*** -0.00626***
(0) (0.00132) (0.00114) (0) (0.00427) (0.00390)
Real GDP per capita -0.186*** -0.0664 -0.0504 -0.184*** -0.0574 -0.0398
(0) (0.308) (0.404) (0) (0.378) (0.503)
Standard retirement age 0.00678 0.00696
(0.544) (0.537)
Constant 6.201*** 4.986*** 4.389*** 6.171*** 4.885*** 4.260***
(0) (0) (9.57e-06) (0) (0) (1.80e-05)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
R-squared (within) 0.348 0.519 0.523 0.333 0.515 0.518
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 -0,03 -0,02 -0,02
Max eect -0,09 -0,06 -0,06 -0,07 -0,05 -0,05
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax 0.0187 -0.00345 0.00105 -0.00931 0.0390 0.0488
(0.653) (0.928) (0.976) (0.882) (0.490) (0.400)
Interaction -0.0182* -0.00745 -0.00838 -0.0102 -0.0200 -0.0224
(0.0715) (0.412) (0.321) (0.517) (0.134) (0.100)
Unemployment rate -0.0114*** -0.00650*** -0.00635*** -0.0115*** -0.00672*** -0.00655***
(0) (0.00617) (0.00508) (0) (0.00303) (0.00286)
Real GDP per capita -0.189*** -0.0673 -0.0567 -0.192*** -0.0917 -0.0803
(0) (0.329) (0.372) (0) (0.154) (0.189)
Standard retirement age 0.00421 0.00587
(0.725) (0.609)
Constant 6.214*** 4.977*** 4.598*** 6.253*** 5.217*** 4.723***
(0) (0) (1.17e-05) (0) (0) (4.14e-06)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
R-squared (within) 0.302 0.499 0.501 0.298 0.506 0.509
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect -0,04 - - - - -
Max eect -0,07 - - - - -
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3 - Panel data : Interactions with average working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 60-64, including early retirement route
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax 0.140** 0.0738 0.0507 0.167*** 0.0943 0.0861
(0.0268) (0.298) (0.436) (0.00447) (0.131) (0.152)
Interaction -0.0459*** -0.0272 -0.0216 -0.0485*** -0.0299** -0.0280**
(0.00309) (0.127) (0.192) (0.000277) (0.0387) (0.0419)
Unemployment rate -0.0109*** -0.00617*** -0.00668*** -0.0107*** -0.00595*** -0.00624***
(0) (0.000518) (0.00152) (0) (0.000987) (0.00340)
Real GDP per capita -0.142*** -0.0109 -0.0510 -0.141*** -0.00678 -0.0394
(1.92e-08) (0.856) (0.443) (1.30e-08) (0.909) (0.551)
Standard retirement age -0.00578 -0.00536
(0.555) (0.576)
Constant 5.738*** 4.444*** 5.211*** 5.731*** 4.402*** 5.065***
(0) (0) (4.79e-08) (0) (0) (6.67e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 317 317 306 317 317 306
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared (within) 0.284 0.500 0.503 0.291 0.503 0.507
Min eect -0,02 - - -0,02 -0,12 -0,11
Max eect -0,06 - - -0,05 -0,14 -0,13
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax 0.0293 -0.00972 -0.00462 -0.0380 0.0387 0.0297
(0.416) (0.742) (0.908) (0.517) (0.431) (0.521)
Interaction -0.0191** -0.00604 -0.00801 0.000903 -0.0197 -0.0177
(0.0498) (0.454) (0.428) (0.953) (0.123) (0.145)
Unemployment rate -0.0107*** -0.00589*** -0.00625*** -0.0109*** -0.00571*** -0.00639***
(0) (0.00128) (0.00545) (0) (0.00198) (0.00268)
Real GDP per capita -0.146*** -0.00751 -0.0444 -0.145*** -0.0164 -0.0605
(1.49e-08) (0.903) (0.527) (5.90e-08) (0.787) (0.362)
Standard retirement age -0.00776 -0.00597
(0.427) (0.537)
Constant 5.772*** 4.408*** 5.270*** 5.767*** 4.487*** 5.310***
(0) (0) (7.70e-08) (0) (0) (2.15e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 317 317 306 317 317 306
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared (within) 0.272 0.493 0.500 0.264 0.500 0.504
Min eect -0,05 - - - - -
Max eect -0,07 - - - - -
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.1 - Panel data : Interactions with the dispersion of working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax -0.0743*** -0.0783*** -0.0789*** -0.0685*** -0.0594*** -0.0589***
(0.000428) (6.08e-06) (1.83e-05) (0.000169) (0.000497) (0.00119)
Interaction 0.243*** 0.269*** 0.301*** 0.346*** 0.290*** 0.329***
(0.000200) (1.30e-05) (6.18e-06) (7.75e-06) (0.000337) (0.000263)
Unemployment rate -0.00925*** -0.00468** -0.00404* -0.00868*** -0.00505** -0.00448*
(0) (0.0462) (0.0732) (2.14e-10) (0.0347) (0.0516)
Real GDP per capita -0.138*** -0.0567 -0.0106 -0.140*** -0.0852 -0.0459
(5.53e-08) (0.483) (0.897) (2.90e-08) (0.279) (0.562)
Standard retirement age 0.0106 0.00952
(0.323) (0.377)
Constant 5.637*** 4.853*** 3.704*** 5.656*** 5.135*** 4.124***
(0) (1.16e-08) (0.00338) (0) (7.28e-10) (0.000791)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared (within) 0.237 0.502 0.510 0.247 0.486 0.493
Min eect -0,05 -0,05 -0,05 -0,04 -0,04 -0,03
Max eect 0 0 0,01 0 0 0,01
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax -0.0206 0.0150 0.0204 -0.0247 -0.0303 -0.0288
(0.506) (0.620) (0.507) (0.209) (0.140) (0.163)
Interaction 0.00308 -0.0643** -0.0695** 0.0118 0.0262 0.0252
(0.930) (0.0319) (0.0195) (0.604) (0.173) (0.217)
Unemployment rate -0.00954*** -0.00732*** -0.00722*** -0.00947*** -0.00606** -0.00600**
(1.00e-09) (0.00210) (0.00214) (1.25e-10) (0.0115) (0.0109)
Real GDP per capita -0.153*** -0.141* -0.127* -0.154*** -0.128 -0.122
(7.40e-09) (0.0643) (0.0988) (5.28e-09) (0.115) (0.127)
Standard retirement age 0.00435 0.00161
(0.710) (0.891)
Constant 5.787*** 5.678*** 5.253*** 5.794*** 5.557*** 5.393***
(0) (0) (2.66e-05) (0) (1.57e-10) (1.97e-05)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared (within) 0.192 0.458 0.459 0.192 0.453 0.453
Min eect - -0,02 -0,02 - - -
Max eect - -0,05 -0,05 - - -
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.2 - Panel data : Interactions with the dispersion of working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59, including early retirement route
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax -0.0780*** -0.0616*** -0.0628*** -0.0704*** -0.0520*** -0.0530***
(2.51e-06) (6.10e-05) (0.000152) (8.33e-07) (7.91e-05) (0.000251)
Interaction 0.159*** 0.147** 0.163*** 0.217*** 0.182** 0.211***
(0.00863) (0.0134) (0.00540) (0.00684) (0.0213) (0.00742)
Unemployment rate -0.0112*** -0.00548** -0.00512** -0.0108*** -0.00537** -0.00491**
(0) (0.0184) (0.0178) (0) (0.0236) (0.0256)
Real GDP per capita -0.175*** -0.0185 0.00585 -0.177*** -0.0353 -0.00973
(0) (0.798) (0.928) (0) (0.610) (0.876)
Standard retirement age 0.00786 0.00839
(0.483) (0.449)
Constant 6.079*** 4.502*** 3.751*** 6.094*** 4.661*** 3.864***
(0) (2.39e-09) (0.000210) (0) (1.45e-10) (0.000115)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
R-squared (within) 0.323 0.519 0.524 0.322 0.515 0.521
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect -0,06 -0,05 -0,04 -0,05 -0,04 -0,04
Max eect -0,03 -0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,01 -0,01
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax -0.0375* -0.0135 -0.0122 -0.0432*** -0.0346*** -0.0335**
(0.0732) (0.509) (0.549) (0.00224) (0.00937) (0.0128)
Interaction -0.0124 -0.0316 -0.0317 -0.000150 0.0159 0.0164
(0.593) (0.221) (0.212) (0.994) (0.446) (0.428)
Unemployment rate -0.0116*** -0.00711*** -0.00700*** -0.0116*** -0.00667*** -0.00655***
(0) (0.00180) (0.00147) (0) (0.00338) (0.00285)
Real GDP per capita -0.188*** -0.0850 -0.0762 -0.189*** -0.0778 -0.0688
(0) (0.184) (0.204) (0) (0.237) (0.268)
Standard retirement age 0.00392 0.00403
(0.744) (0.734)
Constant 6.214*** 5.157*** 4.816*** 6.225*** 5.081*** 4.731***
(0) (0) (3.47e-06) (0) (0) (5.91e-06)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
R-squared (within) 0.297 0.501 0.502 0.296 0.500 0.501
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Min eect - - - - - -
Max eect - - - - - -
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3 - Panel data : Interactions with the dispersion of working conditions
Dependent variable : Labor market participation rate of males aged between 55 and 64
Implicit tax variable : Implicit tax on continued work for age group 60-64, including early retirement route
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel management rel workmates
Implicit tax -0.0605*** -0.0550*** -0.0538*** -0.0680*** -0.0564*** -0.0545***
(0.000227) (2.42e-05) (0.000855) (9.13e-06) (1.32e-05) (9.70e-05)
Interaction 0.110** 0.108** 0.0932* 0.251*** 0.199*** 0.187***
(0.0342) (0.0389) (0.0682) (0.000222) (0.00512) (0.00480)
Unemployment rate -0.0106*** -0.00520*** -0.00577*** -0.00982*** -0.00476*** -0.00489**
(0) (0.00605) (0.00729) (0) (0.00915) (0.0195)
Real GDP per capita -0.134*** 0.0243 -0.0148 -0.130*** 0.0216 -0.00263
(1.44e-07) (0.713) (0.836) (1.24e-07) (0.725) (0.969)
Standard retirement age -0.00454 -0.00320
(0.643) (0.727)
Constant 5.661*** 4.102*** 4.781*** 5.619*** 4.123*** 4.560***
(0) (1.44e-09) (1.75e-06) (0) (5.96e-11) (8.91e-07)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 317 317 306 317 317 306
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared (within) 0.279 0.506 0.507 0.303 0.516 0.518
Min eect -0,05 -0,04 -0,04 -0,05 -0,04 -0,04
Max eect -0,03 -0,02 -0,03 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
job justformoney job evenwithoutmoney
Implicit tax -0.0337** -0.0309** -0.0357** -0.0333** -0.0368*** -0.0406***
(0.0300) (0.0326) (0.0200) (0.0120) (0.000549) (0.00184)
Interaction -0.00300 0.00251 0.00846 -0.00464 0.0203 0.0235
(0.894) (0.925) (0.765) (0.758) (0.241) (0.205)
Unemployment rate -0.0109*** -0.00599*** -0.00647*** -0.0109*** -0.00582*** -0.00639***
(0) (0.000940) (0.00272) (0) (0.00115) (0.00239)
Real GDP per capita -0.145*** -0.0117 -0.0535 -0.145*** -0.0107 -0.0559
(2.42e-08) (0.848) (0.426) (3.46e-08) (0.862) (0.414)
Standard retirement age -0.00813 -0.00863
(0.409) (0.371)
Constant 5.767*** 4.450*** 5.386*** 5.765*** 4.436*** 5.439***
(0) (0) (1.42e-08) (0) (0) (1.44e-08)
Time xed eects - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Observations 317 317 306 317 317 306
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared (within) 0.264 0.493 0.499 0.264 0.496 0.503
Min eect - - - - - -
Max eect - - - - - -
OLS regressions with country xed eects
Robust p values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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